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Abstract—Modern vehicular wireless technology enables vehi-
cles to exchange information at any time, from any place, to any
network – forms the vehicle-to-everything (V2X) communication
platforms. Despite benefits, V2X applications also face great
challenges to security and privacy – a very valid concern
since breaches are not uncommon in automotive communication
networks and applications. In this survey, we provide an extensive
overview of V2X ecosystem. We also review main security/privacy
issues, current standardization activities and existing defense
mechanisms proposed within the V2X domain. We then identified
semantic gaps of existing security solutions and outline possible
open issues.
I. INTRODUCTION
Modern vehicular networks have emerged to facilitate in-
telligent ground transportation systems. Communication tech-
nologies in automobiles connect the various elements such as
vehicles, pedestrians, infrastructures, roads, cloud computing
service platforms, etc. to each other. This has given raise to
the concept of V2X (vehicle-to-everything) communications.
V2X communications uses recent generation of networking
technology to facilitate vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V), vehicle-to-
infrastructure (V2I), vehicle-to-pedestrian (V2P) and vehicle-
to-cloud (V2C) connections (see Fig. 1 for a high-level illustra-
tion). V2X communication technology is expected to improve
traffic efficiency, reducing traffic incidents and road pollution,
saving resources, etc. [1], [2]. Common use-cases for V2X
applications include (but not limited to) [1]–[4]: road safety
(e.g., traffic jam/incident reporting, collision warning and col-
lision avoidance), cooperative automated driving, infotainment
services (e.g., traffic information services), etc.
As with all complex connected computing platforms, extra
computing capabilities in vehicles increase the exposure to
potential vulnerabilities and also the likelihood of future
attacks. Despite the fact that V2X communication aims to
provide a robust and resilient transportation infrastructure,
V2X technologies (both existing as well as expected future
developments) also pose new security challenges. For example,
a malicious vehicle can send false observation about the road
(say traffic jam or an accident) and bias other vehicles to
believe its incorrect observation – as a result other vehicles
are forced to change their behavior (say slow-down or reroute).
Attack detection (and mitigation) is essential for widely de-
ployed V2X systems, considering the fact that attackers may
have physical access to a subset of the system. Attacks to
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Fig. 1. An illustration of V2X communication: V2X-enabled vehicles are
communicating with other vehicles and infrastructures (called RSU [road-
side unit]). An in-vehicle communication unit, known as on-board unit
(OBU) is attached with the vehicular control system and act as an external
communication interface with other entities (e.g., vehicles/RSUs, etc.).
vehicular communication systems can cause data loss, com-
ponent failure and also damage environment/infrastructures.
Therefore securing V2X communicating platforms is crucial
for the design, implementation and wide-scale deployment of
such technology.
Methodology and Contributions
While prior research [5], [6] identifies some V2X se-
curity vulnerabilities and recommends potential mitigation
techniques, there is an absence of a comprehensive summary
of security challenges, standardization activities and existing
solutions. In this paper we investigate V2X security challenges
and summarize existing solutions in a comprehensive manner.
We study over 150 papers crawled from major online literature
archives (Google Scholar, IEEE Xplore, ACM Digital Library,
Scopus, ScienceDirect, Wiley Online Library) published in
the last 25 years (1994-2019) and identify the security issues
and potential countermeasures related to V2X context. We
exclude the papers that are not directly related to vehicular
(communication) security domain (for instance those that are
applicable to more general purpose wireless/sensor networks
and/or mobile adhoc networks, e.g., MANETs). We limit our
study on abnormal system behavior to artifacts of malicious
intent (e.g., not due to hardware or component failures).
We also primarily focus on the security aspects of V2X
communications and provide necessary pointers for the other
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areas (such as radio access mechanisms, resource allocation,
interference management, etc.), when needed.
In this survey we present the following contributions.
• An in-depth discussion of V2X technologies and secu-
rity/privacy standardization activities (Section II).
• Classification and summary of potential security threats
for modern V2X applications (Section IV).
• A taxonomy of misbehavior detection approaches (Sec-
tion V) as well as a comprehensive analysis and dis-
cussion of the state-of-the-art V2X security solutions
(Sections VI and VII).
We also discuss possible open issues (Section VIII), sum-
marize multiple industry/academic/government initiatives for
securing V2X communications (Section IX-A) and compare
our work with related surveys (Section IX-B).
II. V2X PLATFORM : AN OVERVIEW
This section provides an overview of V2X communi-
cation interfaces (Section II-A) and discuss various net-
work/communication models (Section II-B).
A. Communication Interfaces
The internal architecture of a vehicle is interconnected
with ECUs (electronic control units – embedded computing
platform that monitor/control automotive systems) coupled
with sensors and actuators. The communication between the
vehicle and the outside world such as other vehicles or
roadside units (RSUs) is performed via external interfaces (see
Fig. 1). These vehicular external interfaces are attached to the
telematics control unit (TCU) – also referred to as on-board
unit (OBU)1 – an ECU that provides wireless connectivity [7],
[8]. A vehicle control unit coordinates with the OBU to collect
and disseminate vehicular data [9]. The current standards
for V2X communication are DSRC (dedicated short range
communication) [10] in the United States, C-ITS (cooper-
ative intelligent transport systems) [11] in Europe and ITS
Connect [12] in Japan. Both DSRC and C-ITS operating in
the 5.9 GHz ITS band while ITS Connect operating in 760
MHz band (refer to Section II-B1 for details). An alternative
to DSRC/C-ITS is the next generation of cellular wireless
mobile telecommunications technology (see Section II-B2).
OBUs can also be equipped with interfaces for long-range
communication. These long-range wireless channels can be
classified as broadcast channels (signals can be broadcast to
multiple vehicles without knowledge of the receiver’s address)
and addressable channels (where messages are sent to vehicles
with specific addresses.) [13]. Examples of broadcast channels
include the global navigation satellite system (GNSS), traffic
message/satellite radio receivers, etc. Addressable channels are
typically used for long-range voice/data transmissions and are
intended to be used for cellular communications for mobile
broadband [8].
1In this paper we use the terms ‘OBU’ and ‘vehicle’ interchangeably.
B. Network and Communication Model
V2X communication systems [14] consist of vehicle-
to-vehicle (V2V), vehicle-to-pedestrian (V2P), vehicle-to-
infrastructure (V2I), vehicle-to-cloud (V2C), vehicle-to-
network (V2N) as well as vehicle-to-infrastructure-to-vehicle
(V2I2V) communications. This can either use: (a) a technol-
ogy based on IEEE 802.11p standard [15] (operating in the
5.9 GHz frequency) or (b) a long-term evolution (LTE) based
technology. The entities in the network can communicate with
each other (i) directly (e.g., using 802.11p-based technologies
or LTE PC5/Sidelink interface) and/or (ii) by using LTE Uu
interface (uplink and downlink).
1) IEEE 802.11p-based V2X Communications: As men-
tioned in the previous section, the IEEE 802.11p-based adhoc
V2X communication approaches are DSRC [10] in the United
States and C-ITS [11] in Europe and ITS Connect in Japan2.
This IEEE 802.11p-based V2X communication technology is
mature and is already deployed in several countries [16].
Networking patterns for V2X communications are mainly
broadcast and unicast/multicast as information messages [17]
– thus suitable for a wide range of V2X applications such
as large-scale traffic optimization, cooperative cruise con-
trol, lane change warnings etc. For certain applications (e.g.,
over-the-air software/security credential updates, traffic and
fuel management3, non-safety applications such as infotain-
ment/multimedia streaming, etc.) communication with infras-
tructure components, i.e., via RSUs can help in increasing
the communication range and connectivity with back-end
infrastructures as well as the Internet.
The physical transmission (PHY) and medium access con-
trol (MAC) for both DSRC and C-ITS are same, e.g., based
on IEEE 802.11p amendment standards [15] for vehicular
networks. ITS Connect is based on the ARIB STD-T109
standard [19] that is similar to the IEEE 802.11p [15] for
PHY and MAC layers. The technical approaches of DSRC
and C-ITS have many similarities and will be the focus of this
paper. As mentioned earlier, both DSRC and C-ITS operate in
the 5.9 GHz band. In the United States the communication
channels range from 5.825 GHz to 5.925 GHz and the spec-
trum is subdivided into 10 MHz channels while the European
spectrum allocation is sub-divided into several parts: (i) a 30
MHz dedicated primary frequency band for safety and traffic
efficiency applications (class A); (ii) 20 MHz for non-safety
applications (class B); (iii) shared channels for radio local area
networks (class C); and (iv) a set of reserved channels for
future use (class D). In Japan, ITS Connect operates in the
760 MHz band where 9 MHz bandwidth from 755.5 MHz to
764.5 MHz is assigned for both V2V and V2I services using
ITS Connect.
In order to support V2X communication the syntax and
semantics of V2X messages have been defined by standardiza-
tion bodies. For DSRC, the basic safety message (BSM) [20]
conveys core state information about the transmitting vehicle
2In Section III-B, we present the security standardization efforts in detail.
3For instance, using signal phase and time (SPaT) messages [18] RSU units
can inform incoming vehicles about traffic light changes (e.g., green/red) –
allowing more efficient fuel management.
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Fig. 2. A high level schematic of a generic V2X packet format.
such as position, dynamics, status, etc. The BSM is a two-
part message – the first (default) part is periodic (sent at
a rate maximum rate of 10 Hz) and the second part is
event-driven (e.g., for emergency braking, traffic jams, etc.)
and included in the next periodic BSM message. The C-
ITS equivalent of BSM are the periodic cooperative aware-
ness message (CAM) and the (event-driven) decentralized
environmental notification message (DENM) [21]. The event-
driven BSM messages are suitable for local neighborhoods
(e.g., single hop broadcast) where DENMs can be used for
specific geographical areas (e.g., multiple hops geocast). BSM,
CAM, as well as DENM do not use encryption, i.e., they
are transmitted unencrypted [20], [21]. Figure 2 depicts a
generic V2X packet format. For a detailed overview of V2X
communication models, protocol stack and standardization
activities we refer the reader to related work [22].
2) LTE-based V2X Communications: LTE-V2X [23] allows
vehicles to communication with each other with or with-
out relying on base stations. 3GPP (3rd generation partner-
ship project) Release 12 specifies proximity services (ProSe)
for device-to-device (D2D) communications that enables ex-
change of data over short distances through a direct com-
munication link (sidelink) based on PC5 interface (mode 1
and mode 2) and public safety is one of the target services
of LTE-D2D [24]. LTE-V2X is an extension of 3GPP D2D
functionality [25]. 3GPP Release 14 extends the ProSe func-
tionality for LTE-V2X by using the LTE-Uu interface (uplink
and downlink) and the new PC5 interface (mode 3 and mode
4). LTE-V2X PC5 operates in the following two new modes
(see Fig. 3): (a) mode 3 (scheduled resource allocation mode):
LTE-V2X PC5 mode 3 is V2X communication using sidelink
with sidelink scheduling by base stations (e.g., scheduling is
done via Uu links); (b) mode 4 (autonomous resource selection
mode): LTE-V2X PC5 mode 4 is V2X communication using
sidelink with autonomous sidelink resource selections by the
vehicles without the help of base stations [4], [26]. Both
modes use PC5 for V2X communication among vehicles. In
addition, mode 3 uses Uu interface for sidelink scheduling
information between vehicles and base station.
When compared to DSRC/C-ITS, the claim is that LTE-
V2X systems will to provide larger coverage [4], [23]. In
prior work [1], [4], [27]–[31] researchers study and compare
the adhoc V2X communications (e.g., DSRC/C-ITS) with
LTE-V2X in terms of radio resource allocation, performance,
standardization, use-cases, deployment issues, interoperability,
etc. It is worth noting that, unlike the mature DSRC/C-ITS
platforms, LTE-V2X technologies are still under development
and the necessary trials/testing to support large number of
Uu-based LTE-V2X
UL DL
Base Station
PC5-based LTE-V2X
SL
Base Station
UL DL
Fig. 3. LTE-V2X communication modes: (a) Uu-based LTE-V2X (left):
vehicles are communicating with traditional uplink (UL) and downlink (DL)
channels using base station; (b) PC5-based LTE-V2X (right): vehicles use
sidelinks (SL) to communicate each other with or without assistance from
base stations using UL and DL for scheduling sidelink resources.
vehicles in real environments for safety applications is not
yet available [30], [32]. In this paper, we primarily focus
on the security issues for the V2X communications based
on DSRC/C-ITS – although we believe that many of those
schemes can be transferred to LTE-V2X with limited (or
no) modifications. We also discuss the security challenges
and current solutions for LTE-V2X communication systems
(Section VIII-B).
III. EXISTING ARCHITECTURES FOR SECURING V2X
COMMUNICATIONS
In this section we present existing cryptographic solutions
for V2X security (Section III-A) and briefly discuss about
various standardization efforts (Section III-B). We mainly
focus on direct V2X communication scenarios.
A. Public Key Infrastructure
For securing V2X communications (e.g., to ensure message
integrity and authenticity), the common approach is to use
asymmetric cryptography using a public key infrastructure
(PKI) for the management of security credentials [21], [33],
[34]. PKI enables secure exchange of messages over the
network. Each vehicle is provided an asymmetric key pair
and a certificate. The certificate contains the public key with
V2X specific attributes such as ID and is signed by the key
issuing authority – this way vehicles are registered as valid
V2X participants. PKI includes the following key elements:
(a) a trusted party, e.g., root certificate authority (RCA),
that provides services to authenticate the identity of entities;
(b) a registration authority certified by an RCA that issues
certificates for specific uses permitted by the RCA; (c) a
3
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Fig. 4. Schematic of a generic V2X PKI.
database that stores certificate requests and issues/revokes
certificates and (d) an in-vehicle certificate storage – to save
the issued certificates and private keys.
In Fig. 4 we illustrate a high-level PKI for V2X commu-
nications [35]. The communication node (e.g., vehicle and
RSU) is an end-entity of the system that requests certificates
from the PKI and communicates with other end-entities.
The RCA is the root of trust for all certificates. It delivers
certificates to the authorization entities to issue certificates to
the communication nodes. The distribution center provide up-
to-date trust information necessary to validate that received
information obtained from a legitimate and authorized PKI
authority. The operator registers communication nodes and
updates necessary information in the authorization entities.
B. Standardization Efforts for V2X Security
In the United States the major standardization development
organizations (SDO) active in the V2X domain are IEEE
and SAE (Society of Automotive Engineers). In Europe,
the relevant SDOs are ETSI (European Telecommunications
Standards Institute) and CEN (European committee for stan-
dardization). Dedicated working groups within standardiza-
tion organizations and vehicle manufacturers are working
on addressing security and privacy issues for V2X systems,
viz., the IEEE 1609.2 working group, SAE DSRC technical
committee, CAMP-VSC (crash avoidance metrics partnership–
vehicle safety communications) consortium in United States
and the ETSI-TC-ITS-WG5 working group in Europe ad-
dressing security and privacy issues for V2X systems [27],
[36]. Standardization groups in Europe and United States are
separately building V2X security architectures based on PKI
(see related work [37] for details).
CAMP-VSC defines “misbehavior” as the willful or in-
advertent transmission of incorrect data within the vehicular
network and provides mechanisms to detect such transmis-
sions [38]. The team conceptualizes five local misbehavior
detection (LMBD) methods (to identify misbehavior within a
V2V network) and three threshold-based global misbehavior
detection (GMBD) methods (identifying misbehavior at the
vehicle-level using in-vehicle algorithms and processing). The
misbehavior detection techniques use a security credential
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Fig. 5. Protocol stack and related core standards for V2X communications:
(a) in United States (SAE 2945/1); (b) in Europe (ETSI-ITS).
management system (SCMS) and a misbehavior authority
(MA) to identify anomolous vehicles. An OBU can send
misbehavior reports (MBRs) to SCMS that is based on BSM
metadata, for instance: (a) the time and location where the
MBR was created; (b) the LMBD method that caused the MBR
creation and (c) some combination of the start and stop time
and location of the suspected misbehavior (depending on the
LMBD method).
1) V2X Security Standards: IEEE has introduced a standard
for V2X communications – WAVE (wireless access in vehic-
ular environments) [39], [40]. Above the protocol stack, V2X
performance requirements are specified by SAE (e.g., in the
SAE J2945/1 standard [20]) that is used primarily in the United
States. ETSI has also developed standards for V2X commu-
nications, e.g., ETSI-ITS (ETSI intelligent transport system)
that includes an overall architecture, a protocol stack as well
as security requirements and mechanisms [21]. In this section
we mainly focus on the standardization of WAVE/DSRC and
ETSI-ITS since they are the most dominant technologies
for actual deployment [41]. Figure 5 depicts the protocol
stacks with core networking and security standards for V2X
communications in United States (Fig. 5a) and Europe (Fig.
5b).
The SAE 2945/1 standard [20] uses a PKI-based SCMS [34]
for V2X security. The standard also requires mechanisms to
protect privacy: the certificate is changed after a variable length
of time and the entries in the BSM messages (that may be
used to identify/track the vehicle) are randomized whenever a
certificate is changed. The V2X message security is complaint
with the IEEE 1609.2 security service standard [42] that
defines security data structures, secure message formats and
the processing of those secure messages within the WAVE plat-
form. The key features of the IEEE 1609.2 standard include:
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(a) wireless communication scheme between V2X devices
and PKI; (b) certificate validity and revocation schemes and
(c) privacy (e.g., vehicle/user identity) preservation. For an
overview of the IEEE 1609.2 standard we refer the readers to
the related work [43, Ch. 21].
Security services of the IEEE 1609.2 standard support
traditional cryptography mechanisms. The service for mes-
sage authenticity and integrity is based on digital signatures.
Signing and verification are performed using a public key
digital signature algorithm. For instance, the sender computes
a signature using the elliptic curve digital signature algorithm
(ECDSA) and the receiver verifies the signature using the asso-
ciated certificate. For transporting symmetric encryption keys,
the standard uses an asymmetric encryption scheme based
on the elliptic curve integrated encryption scheme (ECIES).
The standard also defines the types of certificate authorities
(CAs), formats of the certificates and certificate revocation lists
(CRLs). The distribution of all security certificates (including
CRLs) is performed by the SCMS.
ETSI defines architectures that applications can use to
meet their security requirements [21]. In order to get access
to the communication infrastructure and services, a vehicle
first contacts an enrolment authority (EA) and authenticates
itself. The EA replies with a set of pseudonymous certificates
(to preserve the true identity of the vehicle as a privacy
measure). These certificates validate that the vehicle can be
trusted to function correctly within the network. To request
permission for accessing a service, the vehicle contacts an
authorisation authority (AA) using one of the pseudonymous
certificates (that represents a temporary identity). The vehicle
then receives a set of certificates in response (one for each
requested service). Vehicles can only access a service if the
AA authorizes it to use that service.
The ETSI certificate format for V2X communications is also
currently based on IEEE 1609.2. The ETSI-ITS security stan-
dards were divided into several technical reports/specifications
that describe (a) the security architecture and management,
(b) trust and privacy models, (c) threat vulnerability and risk
analysis, (d) messages and certificates formats and finally, (e)
PKI models and mapping with IEEE 1609.2. A summary of
the ETSI-ITS security standardization activities is available in
earlier work [44]. It is worth mentioning there exist services
that are proposed by ETSI but not fully supported (or under
development) in the SAE/IEEE (see Table I). A qualitative
comparison of IEEE 1609.2 and ETSI-ITS standard is pre-
sented in prior research [37], [45].
ITS Forum in Japan also provides guidelines to ensure V2X
security [46]: (a) use of encryption (i.e., chosen from the
CRYPTREC [47] list of cryptographic techniques) to verify
authenticity of the sender and the integrity of the messages;
(b) if cryptographic keys have been leaked, the protocol must
provide necessary countermeasures to minimize impact (and
prevent further spread) and (c) information that stored in the
vehicles/RSUs must be protected.
2) Harmonization Efforts: There were two harmoniza-
tion task groups (HTG) established by the United States
and Europian international standards harmonization working
group [48]: (a) HTG1 – to harmonize security standards
TABLE I
SECURITY SERVICE COMPATIBILITY IN ETSI AND SAE/IEEE
Security service ETSI-ITS IEEE 1609.2
Session management By maintaining a
security association
Not fully supported
(on the fly
association by
identifying trust
hierarchy)
Reply protection Timestamp message
and insert/validate
sequence number
Timestamp message
Plausibility validation Supported by
data/parameter
validation
Basic support (based
on geographic
location or message
expiry time)
Misbehavior reporting Not-supported Not supported
(e.g., from CEN, ETSI and IEEE) and promote cooperative
V2X interoperability; and (b) HTG3 – to harmonize com-
munications protocols. The goal of HTGs was to provide
feedback for SDOs and identify areas where policy and/or
regulatory actions can help to improve V2X security [36]. The
harmonization efforts were completed in 2013 [49] and the
reports/recommendations are publicly available online [50],
[51].
IV. SECURITY THREATS IN V2X SYSTEMS
Security threats to V2X systems depend on attacker’s capa-
bilities and methods available to access the target (e.g., vehicle,
RSU and communication channels). Incentives to destabilize
V2X systems include [52]: (a) physical damage/vandalism
(e.g., denial of service, causing an accident, undesired road
congestion by traffic rerouting, etc.); (b) financial incentives
(e.g., steal user’s private information, extract OEM intellectual
properties, insurance fraud, etc.); and (c) non-monetary (e.g.,
enhancement of attackers traffic conditions, improved attacker
reputation, etc.).
A. Attack Variants
We first enumerate the attacker models that are used in
the literature [53]–[55]. Various attacks to V2X systems can
be active or passive – in the case of active attacks, the
adversary actively interacts with the system while the passive
attackers would eavesdrop on critical data (such as private
key, certificates, sensor information, etc.) without directly
interacting with the system and/or disrupting normal behavior.
Examples of active attacks include false code/data injection,
denial-of-service (DoS), alteration of transmitted data (e.g.,
GPS spoofing, broadcast/transaction tampering [56]), etc. In
the V2X context, passive attacks could threaten a user’s
privacy since it is possible to link V2X messages and vehicle
movements to individuals. Attacks can be performed offline,
e.g., when the system is not operational – these types of
attacks often require physical access to the device. Online
attacks, in contrast, can be performed by exploiting hard-
ware/software/communication bugs at runtime. The attacker
could be: (i) an authenticated member of the network allowed
to communicate with other members and/or has system-level
5
TABLE II
ATTACKS IN DIFFERENT COMMUNICATION SCENARIOS
Attack Communication Scenario RemarksBroadcast Multi-hop
Jamming 3 7 Limited by the attacker’s
communication range
Data
flooding
7 3 No routing/forwarding is
involved in broadcast of
BSM/CAM
Sybil 3 3 Vehicles may forward wrong
(DENM) messages received
from Sybil node in multi-hop
scenarios
Message
replay
3 3 Reduces network throughput
especially for multi-hop
scenarios
Legends:
(a) 3The attack poses threats to the communication scenario and
(b) 7The attack does not disrupt the communication scenario .
TABLE III
MAJOR THREATS TO V2X SYSTEMS
Attacks Variants Network Stack
DoS:
• Routing-based Active, online, internal Network
• Flooding Active, online, internal Application, network
• Jamming Active, online, external Physical
Sybil Active, online,
external/internal
Application,
transport, network,
data link
False data injection Active, online, internal Application,
transport, network,
data link, physical
access4 (internal) – these attackers behave according to the
underlying protocol but send false/tampered information or (ii)
may not have valid credential/system access (external) – rather
passively eavesdrop on the communication to infer sensitive
information.
B. V2X Attack Classifications
We now briefly review potential attacks on the V2X systems
(see Fig. 6 for a high-level illustration). While there exist
prior surveys [37], [57], [58] that discuss possible attacks
for vehicular networks, in this paper we primarily focus on
attacks that can be performed within the scope of existing
V2X security mechanisms. In Tables III and II we summarize
the possible attacks for V2X systems. The major attacks we
focus on: (a) DoS (Section IV-B1), (b) Sybil (Section IV-B2)
and (c) false data injection (Section IV-B3).
1) DoS Attacks: DoS attacks can happen in different layers
of the network where an adversary sends more requests than
the system can handle. For instance, an attacker could try
to shutdown/disrupt the network established by RSUs and
stop communication between vehicles and/or RSUs [57]. In a
distributed DoS (DDoS) attack [59] malicious nodes launch
attacks from different locations thus making it harder to
detect. In the physical layer, an important type of DoS attack
is the jamming attack [60] (refer to the related work [61]
for detailed classification) where the attacker disrupts the
4Not necessarily physical access to the system.
communication channel (e.g., by electromagnatic interference)
and can filter/limit incoming messages. Jamming functions
well only in geographically restricted areas, i.e., say within
the range of the attacker(s) wireless device. We also note that
most jamming/DoS attacks on the PHY level (IEEE 802.11p)
or the bands around 5.9 GHz are always restricted by the range
of the attacker(s) and do not impact V2X communications
everywhere. Jamming attack does not require any particular
knowledge of the semantics of the exchanged messages [58].
Although jamming attacks are not specific to V2X systems
(i.e., can be a threat for any wireless network), such attacks can
increase the latency in the V2X communications and reduce
the reliability of the network [62].
In the network layer, routing-based DoS attacks such as
JellyFish attack [63] exploits vulnerabilities in congestion con-
trol protocols and the attacker delays or (periodically) drops
packets (albeit does not violate protocol specifications). Packet
dropping is catastrophic for safety-related applications – for
instance, a vehicle involved in a traffic accident should propa-
gate warning messages, but other vehicles could be prevented
from receiving these warning messages by an attacker who
intentionally drops/miss-routes packets. Another variant is the
intelligent cheater attack [57] where an adversary obeys the
routing protocol specifications but misbehaves intermittently.
Such attacks require long term monitoring for detection [63]
that could be impracticable for V2X scenario due to high
mobility. Flooding attacks [57] such as data flooding (e.g.,
where an attacker creates bogus data packets and sends it
to their neighbors) can make the network resources (e.g.,
bandwidth, power, etc.) unavailable to legitimate users. We
note that these routing-based attacks can only be performed to
multi-hop communication networks (e.g., not single-hop direct
communications such as broadcasting BSM).
2) Sybil Attacks: This is a well-known harmful attack in
wireless vehicular networks where a vehicle pretends to have
more than one identify (e.g., multiple certified key-pairs) either
at the same time or in succession [64]. Sybil attackers may
also launch DoS attacks, waste network bandwidth, destabilize
the overall network and pose threats to safety [57], [65]. For
instance, if a malicious vehicle changes its identity, it may
use multiple pseudonyms to appear as a different, moving
vehicle or make it appear that the road is congested (even
though it is not) and send incorrect information about the road
conditions to neighbouring vehicles/RSUs. A Sybil attacker
could also use the pseudo-identities to maliciously boost the
reputation/trust score (e.g., that use to measure how much
neighbors can rely on information send by a given vehicle
Vi), etc. of specific vehicles or, conversely, reduce the score
of legitimate vehicles [58].
3) False Data Injection: A rogue vehicle could generate
false traffic/safety messages or incorrect traffic estimation
information (that differs from real-world information) and
broadcast it to the network with the intention of disrupting
road traffic or triggering a collision [57], [66]. Sybil attackers
can claim their existence at multiple locations and can thus
inject false information in the network. By GPS spoofing
an attacker could inject false position information by using
GPS simulators and the victim vehicles may end up accepting
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Fig. 6. Possible attacks scenarios of V2X with malicious (black) and victim (blue) vehicles: (a) DoS attacks: 1© attacker floods message packets and 2© jams
the communication channel; (b) Sybil attacks: adversary creates two fake identities and send false messages; (c) false data injection: attacker sends incorrect
information (e.g., about location, sensor data, object/pedestrian info, etc.).
these generated, fake, (but stronger than original) signals.
Incorrect data such as falsified location information could
decrease message delivery efficiency by up to approximately
90% [67]. Researchers have shown that cooperative adaptive
cruise control (CACC) – an important V2X use-case – is
specifically vulnerable to false data injection attacks [68], [69].
Another type of false data injection is replay attack where
an attacker re-transmits messages to exploit the conditions
at the time when the original message was sent (e.g., the
attacker stores the event information and will resend it later,
even though it is no longer valid) [33], [57]. For instance,
in location-based replay attacks the attacker records an au-
thenticated message at a location Li, transmits it quickly to
a location Lj (and re-broadcasts it at Lj). Similarly, in time-
based replay attacks, an adversary records a valid message at
time t1 and replays it later (at the same location) at another
time t2. For replay protection, there exist mechanisms such as:
(a) including a time stamp in every message – say by using
a global navigation satellite system (GNSS) [70] and/or (b)
digitally signing and including sequence numbers [40], [44],
etc. The V2X standards [21], [39] also provide mechanisms
for replay protection: the maximum transmission delay of
single-hop messages would need to be verified by receiving
stations and messages with an outdated timestamp (or a future
timestamp) should be considered as not plausible. Replay
attacks in multi-hop V2X communication (i.e., DENMs) are
related to routing misbehavior (e.g., where the attacker may
deviate from the routing protocol and reroute messages to
specific vehicles and/or drop messages) [37], [57]. While
replay attacks (specially for multi-hop communications) can
affect network throughput, support of infrastructures such as
RSUs (and base stations for C-V2X) can reduce the impact of
routing misbehavior [58].
V. MISBEHAVIOR IN V2X COMMUNICATIONS
In V2X security literature researchers often use the term
misbehavior [53], [57], [58], [66], [71]. This commonly refers
to attacks that are executed by the malicious entity, e.g., a
misbehaving node transmits erroneous data that it should not
transmit when the system is behaving as expected. This is
different than faulty nodes [72]–[74], i.e., when an entity
produces incorrect or inaccurate data without malicious intent.
While these definitions are not consistently used in literature,
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Table IV we summarize how various classes of attacks can be detected by
these approaches.
in this paper we use ‘misbehavior detection’ to refer to the
uncovering of malicious entities.
In the following, we (a) describe threat model and commons
assumptions on adversarial capabilities (Section V-A and then
(b) provide a summary of various misbehavior detection
mechanisms (Section V-B).
A. Threat Model
As we discussed in Section II, protection of wireless
V2X communications by use of cryptographic credentials is
a common approach. In the following we assume that the
attacker has the credentials to communicate with other vehicles
in the network (e.g., an internal attacker) and the attackers
are able to distribute bogus information [75]. For instance,
the attacker could send false information or conceal some
information, tamper with its own message contents (e.g., event
type/location, node position, etc.), generate false messages
or bias another vehicle’s decisions (by sending erroneous
messages). We also assume that the RSUs are trusted in
general (although in Section VIII we discuss cases when we
relax this assumption).
B. Classification of Detection and Prevention Mechanisms
In Fig. 7 we illustrate various misbehavior detec-
tion/prevention approaches. V2X security approaches can
broadly be characterized as proactive and reactive mecha-
nisms [58], [66]. Proactive security refers to any kind of
mechanism that enforces a security policy – say use of a
PKI, digital signatures and certificates, tamper-proof hardware,
etc. This reduces the chances of bogus information exchange
7
by unauthorized entities due to lack of credentials and can
be maintained through a combination of infrastructure and
tamper-proof hardware [76]. While these mechanisms reduce
attack surfaces by detracting external attackers, insider attack-
ers can generate legitimate false information. Such schemes
also face scalability and complex management issues (e.g.,
key management, revocation, trust establishment in multi-hop
communication). Reactive mechanisms can be enforced where
the attacks cannot be prevented by proactive security policies.
These mechanisms can be grouped into two classes: (a) entity-
centric and (b) data-centric. Entity-centric approaches focus
on identifying the misbehaving node generally based on trust
establishment (say from past behavior/interactions) by using
a PKI or in a cooperative manner (e.g., using signature
verification). Data-centric approaches, in contrast, verify the
correctness of the received data (instead of investigating the
trustworthiness of the sender).
Entity-centric detection approaches can be further subdi-
vided into: (a) behavioral (e.g., observes patterns in the
behavior of specific nodes at the protocol level) and (b)
trust-based (e.g., evaluation of trust-score, often using a
central authority to remove malicious nodes). Data-centric
mechanisms are similar to intrusion detection in traditional
computing systems that correlate the received information with
the information already known from previous history/behavior.
These approaches can be either: (a) plausibility-based (model-
based approach that verifies if the information transmitted
from a particular sender is consistent with the model) or
(b) consistency-based (e.g., use information of packets –
generally from multiple participants – to determine the trust-
worthiness of new data). We highlight that entity-centric and
data-centric detection mechanisms are mostly orthogonal and
often researchers propose to use combinations of both types.
Depending on the scope, detection mechanisms can be: (a)
local (e.g., performed locally, say by vehicle OBUs and not
affected by detection mechanisms in other vehicles; or in
the back-end by the RSUs) and/or (b) cooperative (detection
relies on collaboration between vehicles/RSUs). In contrast
to RSU-based mechanisms, OBU-based approaches do not
need dedicated infrastructure (e.g., vehicles performing sit-
uation evaluation by themselves without any infrastructure).
Researchers also proposed hybrid approaches where both RSU
and OBUs are jointly involved in misbehavior detection (see
Sections VI and VII). Behavioral and plausibility schemes
generally operate locally while consistency and trust-based
rely on cooperation among vehicles/RSUs to detect incon-
sistencies. Some consistency-based mechanisms can also be
performed locally for more fine-grained detection with the cost
of exposing them to Sybil attacks.
We now briefly review the mechanisms to secure V2X
communications from different classes of attacks (Sections VI
and VII). Table IV summarizes the exiting solutions.
VI. DOS AND SYBIL ATTACK DETECTION
In this section we first present solutions to detect DoS
attacks (Section VI-A) and then describe various approaches
proposed in literature for Sybil attack detection (Section VI-B).
A. DoS Detection/Mitigation
Since DoS attacks [131] can be implemented at varying lay-
ers, researchers proposed different solutions to detect/mitigate
the changes of attacks. Jamming-based DoS attacks can be de-
tected by behavioral mechanisms – for instance, by analyzing
the patterns in radio interference [77] as well as by using sta-
tistical network traffic analysis and data mining methods [78].
The chances that (external) attackers to intrude/disrupt the
system can also be reduced by using short-time private-public
keys with a hash function [79]. He et al. [80] proposed to
use a pre-authentication process before signature verification
to prevent DoS attacks against signature-based authentica-
tion (where attackers broadcast forged messages with invalid
signatures – leading to unnecessary signature verifications).
Researchers also proposed alternatives to digital signatures –
a new authentication method (called Tesla++) [81] that reduces
the memory requirement at the receiver for authentication and
can be used to limit the chances of resource (e.g., memory)
exhaustion. A downside of these protocols is a high delay
between message arrival and message authentication.
Given the fact that the routing in V2X is predictable
and standardized, network layer DoS attacks such as packet
dropping can be detected by watchdog mechanisms [82] where
each vehicle uses the idea of neighbor trust level (determined
as the ratio of packets sent to the neighbor and the packets
are forwarded by the neighbor). Packets may not be forwarded
due to a collision and/or an attack. If a vehicle is repeatedly
dropping packets (until a tolerance threshold is exceeded), the
vehicle is considered as malicious – although the evaluation
results show that it is difficult to find a global threshold (e.g.,
for deciding when misbehavior should be detected). Packet
dropping/duplication can be prevented by clustering based
monitoring [83] where a set of vehicles in a cluster (called
verifiers) monitor the behavior of a (newly joined) vehicle.
Vehicles that acted maliciously are blocked by certificate
authority (CA) and are informed other vehicles.
There exist mechanisms [84] to detect flooding-based DoS
attacks by observing channel access patterns – for instance, by
generating an adaptive threshold (that represents the maximum
rate of messages any vehicle can send with respect to other
vehicles). This approach may not be scalable for generic use-
cases since the scheme is designed for vehicles communicating
with a single RSU. Similar infrastructure-assisted mechanisms
such as those proposed by Verma et al. [85], [86] can prevent
DoS attacks by: (a) monitoring V2X messages (that checks the
number of outstanding packets with a predetermined threshold
within a certain window of time); or (b) by using a message
marking policy where packets are marked by the edge routers
(say RSUs) and if the sender IPs are found malicious, an
alarm is sent to other vehicles. Recent work [87] proposed
to randomize the RSU packet transmission schedule and a
modification of the congestion control schemes to mitigate
packet flooding-based DoS/DDoS attacks. Message flooding
can also be detected by trust-based mechanisms [88], [89].
Hasrouny et al. [88] propose to calculate trust values of
the vehicles that can limit the number of accepted received
messages from neighbors – if a certain threshold is exceeded
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TABLE IV
SUMMARY OF MISBEHAVIOR DETECTION MECHANISMS FOR V2X COMMUNICATIONS*
*The terms OBU-L, OBU-C and OBU-L/C represent whether a vehicle OBU performs decisions: (a) locally (OBU-L), (b) with the involvement of neighboring vehicles (OBU-C)
or (c) using the combination of both (OBU-L/C). If any scheme requires assistance of infrastructure (CA, MA, etc. say for misbehavior reporting), we consider RSUs as the entry
point to communicate with the back-end.
Reference Decision
Involvement
Approach Defense Against Key Idea Major Limitation(s)
Hamieh et al. [77],
Lyamin et al. [78]
OBU-L Entity-centric DoS (jamming) Detect patterns in radio interference to
differentiate jamming and legitimate
scenarios
No attacker identification
Chuang et al. [79] OBU-C, RSU Entity-centric DoS (flooding,
resource
exhaustion)
Use short-term key-pairs Extra message exchange
overhead
He et al. [80],
Studer et al. [81]
RSU Entity-centric DoS (resource
exhaustion)
Use pre-authentication [80], alternative
authentication mechanism with
reduced memory/computation
requirement [81]
Increased communication
latency
Hortelano
et al. [82],
Daeinabi et al. [83]
OBU-L [82],
OBU-C and
RSU [83]
Entity-centric DoS (malicious
packet drop-
ping/forwarding)
Predict the (expected) behavior of the
neighbors by using a watchdog
No privacy discussion and
only detects malicious packet
forwarding
Soryal et al. [84],
Verma et al. [85],
[86]
RSU Entity-centric DoS (packet
flooding)
Monitor message exchange pattern Lack of scalability
Biswas et al. [87] RSU Entity-centric DDoS (packet
flooding)
Randomize message schedule of the
RSU
Does not work if the attacker
can reproduce the randomized
schedule
Hasrouny
et al. [88]
OBU-L/C,
RSU
Entity-centric DoS (packet
flooding)
Limit the number of accepted received
messages by calculating a trust score
Lack of implementation
details and performance
evaluation
Kerrache et al. [89] OBU-C, RSU Entity and
data-centric
DoS (packet
flooding)
Trust-based data verification and
routing mechanism to eliminate
misbehaving vehicles
Stealthy attacker can bypass
the detection mechanisms
Continued on next page.
(which will be the case in DoS attack), a report is sent
to the trusted entity, say misbehavior authority (MA) [34],
to deactivate the attacker. The TFDD framework [89] can
detect DoS and DDoS attacks in a distributed manner by
trust establishment between vehicles. Each vehicle maintains
local and global parameters (e.g., neighbor id, various message
counters, trust score) in order to include/exclude neighbours
from a local or global black-list. A globally blacklisted vehicle
can be suspended from network operations by the trusted
authority [132]. The proposed mechanism may not work for an
intelligent, stealthy attacker whose (malicious) behavior may
not remain stable throughout time.
B. Detecting Sybil Attacks
Researchers proposed to detect Sybil attacks in V2X net-
works that can work either (i) without any infrastructural
support [64], [75], [90]–[93] (Section VI-B1) or (ii) with
assistance from infrastructure (e.g., RSU, PKI, trusted author-
ity) [95]–[104], [106] (Section VI-B2).
1) Infrastructure-less Sybil Detection: Grover et al. [90]
suggest that the fake identities of the attacker must always
be in the same vicinity (for better control over malicious
nodes) and proposed a detection by comparing the tables
of several neighboring vehicles over time. This scheme does
not protect against Sybil attacks that have a short duration.
The communication overhead and detection latency is high,
and certain scenarios (e.g., traffic jams) may increase false
positives or detection latency. Hao et al. [91] proposed a
cooperative protocol that utilizes group signature (to preserve
privacy) and correlation of mobility traces. The key idea is
that vehicles around a possible attacker inform others by
broadcasting warning messages with their partial signatures –
a complete signature can be derived (and hence the attacker is
identified) when the number of vehicles that report anomalies
reaches a threshold. The protocol is not verified for the case
of multiple Sybil attackers.
A model-based approach, based on position verification, is
proposed by Golle et al. [92] where each node contains a
model of the network and checks the validity of the received
data using local sensors (i.e., camera, infrared and radars).
Data collected from the sensors can be used to distinguish
between nodes. Inconsistencies can then be detected (i.e.,
in case of Sybil attacks), based on the proposed heuristic
mechanism, by comparing the received data with the model.
For instance, using a camera reading and exchanging data
via a light spectrum a vehicle can verify whether a claimed
position is true. Thus one can determine the real existence of
the vehicle. However it is generally hard to obtain a generic
model of the V2X network due to the dynamic nature and the
proposed method is designed by considering high density road
conditions only (i.e., may not perform well for low density
situations or roads where vehicle density varies over time).
Researchers also proposed the identification of falsified
positions by exploiting channel properties, for instance, by
analyzing its signal strength distribution [64], [93], [95] or by
observing RSSI (received signal strength indicator) measure-
ments [94]. A Sybil detection approach [93] analyzes physical
layer properties under the assumption that antennas, gains and
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Reference Decision
Involvement
Approach Defense Against Key Idea Major Limitation(s)
Grover et al. [90] OBU-C Data-centric Sybil attack Compare neighbor-set of several
vehicles over time
Possible false-positive errors,
no prevention for short-term
Sybil attacks
Hao et al. [91] OBU-C Data-centric Sybil attack Use correlation of mobility traces to
identify Sybil nodes
May not detect multiple Sybil
attackers
Golle et al. [92] OBU-C Data-centric Sybil attack Compare revived data with an
expected model
Require a suitable model
to compare against, no
validations or performance
test is performed
Guette et al. [93],
Yao et al. [94]
OBU-L Data-centric Sybil attack Link Sybil nodes through physical
characteristics (e.g., RSSI)
Infeasible with GPS
errors [93], could be failed
if attacker uses multiple
radios [94]
Ruj et al. [75] OBU-L, RSU Data-centric Sybil attack,
position cheating
Monitor and compare the messages
with an expected behavioral model
to analyze if such events are actually
happened
No validations or perfor-
mance test, unrealistic
assumptions
Xiao et al. [95] OBU-C, RSU Entity-centric Sybil attack Analyze signal strengths of the
received beacons
No way to verify behavior of
the ‘verifier’ vehicle
Sowattana
et al. [96]
OBU-C Entity-centric Sybil attack Analyze validity of received beacons
and generates trust score (of a given
vehicle) through a voting mechanism
Voting mechanism itself
could be vulnerable to Sybil
attack
Park et al. [97] OBU-L, RSU Entity-centric Sybil attack Observe similarity of motion
trajectories
May not detect correctly
for all scenarios (e.g., when
two vehicles coming from
opposite directions)
Zhou et al. [98] RSU Entity-centric Sybil attack Link pseudonyms to common values
using hash functions
No privacy preservation for
the central authority
Hamed et al. [99] RSU Entity-centric Sybil attack Monitor mobility pattern of the
vehicles
Finding proper detection
threshold, increase false
positive/negative errors
Chen et al. [100] OBU-C, RSU Entity-centric Sybil attack Exchange digital signature (that is
periodically issued by the RSU)
among neighbors and compare it with
a reference trajectory
Prone to false positive errors,
high overhead, does not
consider vehicle privacy
Chang et al. [101] OBU-C, RSU Entity-centric Sybil attack Observe similarity of motion
trajectories
Potential false positives,
geared towards urban
networks only
Lee et al. [102],
Rahbari et al. [103]
RSU Entity-centric Sybil attack Use session key-based certificates
[102] or PKI/CA to compare reply
messages received from RSU [103]
Extra information exchange
overhead (i.e., reduced
throughput)
Feng et al. [104] OBU-C, RSU Entity-centric Sybil attack Use short-term public key and
pseudonyms
Could collapse if
RSUs/OBUs are compro-
mised
Chen et al. [105],
Singh et al. [106]
OBU-C [105],
OBU-L and
RSU [106]
Entity-centric Sybil attack Use of specific certificates and
cryptographically protected usage
restriction of the credentials
Extra computa-
tion/communication overhead
Continued on next page.
transmission powers are fixed and known to all the vehicles
in the network. The authors use received signal strength to
determine the approximate distance to the sender and further
verify the transmitted GPS position. A similar idea is also
used [75] to verify locations by finding the co-relation between
location, time and transmission duration (for both beacons
and event messages). A post-event validation approach verifies
specific event messages (by analyzing messages from other
vehicles) and also pseudonym change mechanism is applied
once a claimed event is detected as being malicious (e.g., that
is detected by a lack of subsequent beacon messages from
the same source). This scheme, however, can be exploited to
revoke legitimate vehicles by an attacker with jamming capa-
bilities (since they are based on physical-layer signal proper-
ties) [58]. Prior work [75], [93] also do not account for GPS
errors in the model. A distributed mechanism, Voiceprint [94],
was proposed to detect Sybil attacks by analyzing RSSI
(received signal strength indicator)-based measurements (e.g.,
by performing a similarity measures between the RSSI of an
attacker and its Sybil nodes over time). However Voiceprint
may not detect attacks if an adversary uses more than one
radio.
2) RSU-assisted Sybil Detection: There exist mecha-
nisms [95]–[104], [106] to use a centralized authority (e.g.,
RSU) to detect Sybil nodes. In an earlier study Xiao et al. [95]
verify claimed positions using signal strength metrics where
vehicles are assigned three roles: (i) claimer (a vehicle claims a
position using a beacon), (ii) witness, (a node receives a beacon
and measures its proximity using the received signal strength
that is then transmitted in subsequent beacons) and (iii) verifier
(the vehicle that collects signal strength measurements to
estimate and verify the position of a vehicle). RSUs issue
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Reference Decision
Involvement
Approach Defense Against Key Idea Major Limitation(s)
Kim et al. [107] OBU-C, RSU Entity-centric False event
notification
Filter messages based local sensor
information and event specific data
Highly application specific
and depends on verified
positions
Cao et al. [108],
Hsiao et al. [109],
Petit et al. [110]
OBU-C Entity-centric False event
notification
Determine the correctness of event
reports through voting/consensus
Weak attacker model, prone
to Sybil attacks
Ghosh et al. [111] OBU-L Data-centric False event
notification
Correlate future behavior from past
events
Requires specific driver
behavior for validation (po-
tential false positive/negative
errors)
Schmidt
et al. [112]
OBU-L/C Data-centric False data
injection
Build reputation through evaluating
vehicle behavior
Assumes a honest majority,
no performance test
Yang et al. [113] OBU-L, RSU Entity-centric False data
injection
Monitor vehicle behaviors by logging
message transmissions
Requires strong authentication
and identification mechanism
Lo et al. [114] OBU-L Data-centric False data
injection
Monitor sensor values/received
messages and ensure validity using
a rule database
Shared rule database can leak
information to the attackers
Vora et al. [115] RSU Entity-centric Position cheating Perform position verification using
multiple ‘verifier’ RSUs
Vulnerable to targeted attacks
Yan et al. [116] OBU-C Data-centric Position cheating Check consistency of messages from
multiple sources (e.g., on-board radar,
incoming traffic data, etc.)
Performance overhead, lack
of privacy
Stu¨bing
et al. [117], [118],
Jaeger et al. [119]
OBU-L Data-centric Position cheating Analyze CAM message sequences and
track the vehicles
Computationally expensive,
chances of (partial) privacy
breach
Sun et al. [120],
Hubaux et al. [121]
OBU-L [120],
RSU [121]
Data-centric Position cheating Verify position using physical
properties (e.g., Doppler speed
measurements [120], speed of
light [121], etc.)
Additional hardware require-
ment [120], potential chances
of replay attacks [121]
Leinmu¨ller
et al. [122]–[124]
OBU-C Data-centric Position cheating Verify positions by: (a) discarding
packets if the distance is farther [122],
(b) cooperatively exchange position
information [123] (c) including
additional checking [124]
Limited detection capabilities
Studer et al. [125] OBU-L Data-centric GPS spoofing Estimate current position based on
previous calculations
May cause approximation
error
Zaidi et al. [126] OBU-L Data-centric False data
injection, Sybil
attack
Perform statistical analysis to analyze
traffic flow
Limited application scenario,
Stealthy attacker may remain
undetected
Rawat et al. [127] OBU-L Entity-centric False data
injection
Predict vehicle behavior using
Bayesian logic
Potential classification errors,
hard to obtain parameters
Kerrache
et al. [128]
OBU-C, RSU Entity and
Data-centric
False data
injection
Obverve vehicle behavior by local and
global trust scores
May not work well if the
adversarial behavior changes
dynamically
Raya et al. [71],
Moore et al. [129]
OBU-C Entity-centric False data
injection
Find deviations from normal/average
behavior
Prone to Sybil attacks,
potential false positives
Zhuo et al. [130] OBU-C, RSU Entity-centric False data
injection
Remove misbehaving insiders from
local and global analysis
Vulnerable to Sybil attacks
signatures of vehicles in their proximity at a specific time
along with a driving direction. When a beacon message is
received, the verifier waits for a period of time (to collect
previous measurements of the claimer from witness) and
calculate an estimated position of the claimer. A similar idea is
used in a consensus-based Sybil detection scheme [96]: each
receiver validates the validity of received beacons by trans-
mission range of those neighbors and generates a trust score
using a voting scheme. The voting process itself, however, is
vulnerable to the attack.
Researchers also proposed [97] to use message timestaps
(e.g., to find each vehicle’s recent trajectory and time) for
Sybil detection that do not require any PKI. Before sending
any messages, a vehicle first obtains a timestamp for the
message from a nearby RSU. If a vehicle receives similar
timestamp series from the same RSUs for a certain amount
of time then that vehicle is considered as Sybil node. How-
ever two vehicles coming from opposite directions could be
incorrectly marked as Sybil nodes since they will receive
similar timestamps for a short time period. The P2DAP
framework [98] detects Sybil attacks by identifying vehicles
with different pseudonyms and propose an inherent linking
between pseudonyms based on hash functions. For instance, a
message is considered malicious if the tuple, (time, location,
event type), is signed by the same vehicle with different
pseudonyms. The (semi-trusted) RSUs are responsible for
checking messages the linking and reports it to the central
authority (that can resolve pseudonymity). However the ability
to link arbitrary pseudonyms may be a privacy issue. Time
and spatial granularity as well as event types needs to be
standardized and also the central authority requires the com-
plete knowledge of the network. Similar architecture was used
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in recent work [99]. It leverages the fact that two vehicles
may not pass multiple RSUs at the same time. The authors
proposed to detect Sybil nodes by monitoring mobility patterns
of vehicles. This scheme requires a global view of the network
and also the estimation of a proper detection threshold is not
straightforward (may result in false positive/negative errors).
Chen et al. [100] identify that Sybil nodes that originate
from the same vehicle will always have similar trajectories
over time. With this observation a new protocol uses special
signatures (obtained from RSUs) that can be used to build a
reference trajectory. Identities with identical recent trajecto-
ries are considered to be the same vehicle thus minimizing
the effect of Sybil attacks. However there exists practical
limitations: (a) bandwidth overhead for signature exchanges;
(b) potential chances of DoS attacks – since each request
requires a much larger response (e.g., the signatures) and
(c) privacy violations – vehicles need to reveal their position
traces (i.e., set of signatures) to verify themselves as non-Sybil
nodes. The ideas were also extended in the privacy preserving
Footprint framework [101] where cryptographically protected
trajectories (consisting of special signatures) are requested
by the vehicle from the RSUs. The trajectories for every
message are used as an authentication mechanism that allows
a vehicle to compute the Sybil nodes (e.g., when all trajec-
tories that are suspiciously similar are coming from a same
vehicle). Footprint protects vehicle privacy (e.g., from long-
term tracking) since signatures of RSUs are time-dependent
(and unpredictable).
Another privacy-preserving protocol – DTSA [102] uses
session key-based certificates where each vehicle’s (unique)
ID is registered to a global server. The vehicles then generate
anonymous IDs that are validated by a local server (and a
local certificate is issued). Any receiving vehicle can verify the
message by comparing the other vehicle’s true identity with
the local server. This scheme may reduce network through-
put since certification exchanges require a large amount of
overhead data. Similar ideas exist in earlier work [103] that
utilizes PKI and a local CA to detect Sybil attacks by
comparing the reply message received from the RSU. More
recent framework EBRS (event based reputation system) [104]
proposed to use short-term public key and pseudonyms that
needs to be validated by a trusted authority (e.g., by using
RSUs). While EBRS can detect attacks from multiple sources,
this framework may collapse if the RSUs and/or OBUs are
compromised. Researchers also proposed to use anonymous
credentials (i.e., a specific certificates) and a cryptographically
protected usage restriction of the credentials – since the sender
is allowed to use only one credential per time Sybil nodes
then can be detected [105], [106]. However the performance
overheads of these approaches are high compared to the
ECDSA algorithm proposed in the standards [21], [39].
VII. INTEGRITY CHECKING
The integrity of V2X communication can be verified
from different contexts such as: (i) validating events (Sec-
tion VII-A), (ii) checking message integrity (Section VII-B),
(iii) location verification (Section VII-C) and (iv) reputation
analysis (Section VII-D) as we discuss in the following.
A. Event Validation
Kim et al. [107] propose a message filtering mechanism
that combines parameters of messages into a single entity
called the ‘certainty of event’ (CoE) curve. CoE represents
the confidence level of a received message and is calculated
by combining the data from various sources such as local
sensors and RSUs and by using consensus mechanisms (e.g.,
messages from other vehicles and validation by infrastructure,
if available). Message validity is defined using a threshold
curve and false positives for events can be reduced when
more evidence is obtained over time. While the mechanism
is applied to the the emergency electronic break light applica-
tion (e.g., that enables broadcasting self-generated emergency
brake event information to nearby vehicles), it unclear how
this scheme behaves for generic V2X applications (say for
multiple lanes and urban settings where there may be some
uncertainty about the vehicle paths) since it requires specific
locations for the events. Besides, such CoE-based mechanisms
could be vulnerable to Sybil attacks depending on how the
information from other sources are captured.
Researchers also proposed to determine the correctness of
event reports through voting [108] – the key idea is develop
an efficient way to collect signatures from a sufficient number
of witnesses without adding too much (bandwidth) overheads
on the wireless channel. If insufficient signatures are received,
events may be missed completely (i.e., may cause false nega-
tive errors). A similar idea is also used by Hsiao et al. [109]
where the senders collect a number of witnesses for each pos-
sible event. However this model enforces a specific message
format and there is no deflation protection, i.e., the attacker
can reduce the amount of signatures attached to the message
and/or can hide events. A consensus-based mechanism is
proposed [110] where each vehicle collects reports about the
same event from neighboring vehicles until a certain threshold
of supporting reports is passed (after which the message is
considered to be trustworthy). The proposed method allows
the system to reach a decision within a bounded waiting time
and thus suitable for time/safety-critical applications (e.g., the
decision whether to trust the warning about traffic accident
that must be made early so that the vehicle can slow down
or change lanes accordingly). Similar to the most consensus-
based mechanisms, this approach also suffers from potential
Sybil attacks.
The idea of post-event detection [111] can also be used
for event validation: for instance, in post-crash notification
(PCN) applications, once a PCN message is sent drivers adapt
their behavior to avoid crash site and this information (e.g.,
drivers behavior) can be used to identify whether the event
was valid or not. The key idea is to use a technique (called
root cause analysis) to detect which part of the event message
was false (e.g., upon receiving a PCN alert, the vehicle
analyzes the sender’s behaviors for a while and compares the
actual trajectory and the expected trajectory). Such detection
approaches suffer if the driver behavior models are fragile –
although this may not be a limiting factor for autonomous
driving where valid driver behavior will be more well-defined.
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B. Behavioral Analysis and Message Integrity Checking
The VEBAS (vehicle behavior analysis and evaluation
scheme) protocol [112] allows the detection of unusual vehicle
behavior by analyzing all messages received from neighboring
vehicles. VEBAS uses a a trust-based mechanism, e.g., once a
vehicle has collected information about surrounding vehicles,
it will then broadcast the results (e.g., trust-scores) within
the single hop neighborhood. This checking mechanism uses
a combination of behavioral mechanisms (e.g., frequency of
sending beacons) and physical parameters such as velocity and
acceleration to determine the authenticity of a message. How-
ever VEBAS could be vulnerable since there is no mechanism
the verify the correctness of the messages received from the
neighbours.
The MisDis protocol [113] ensures accountability of vehicle
behaviour by recording all the (sent/received) messages for
each vehicle peer in a secure log. Any vehicle can request
the secure log of another vehicle and independently determine
deviation from expected behavior. This protocol, however,
requires strong identification and authentication mechanisms
and there is no discussion about how the vehicle privacy
is preserved. Also authors do not provide any performance
evaluation of the proposed method. Lo et al. [114] propose
a plausibility validation network (PVN) to protect the V2X
applications from false data injection attacks (called illusion
attacks) where attacker can indirectly manipulate messages
(e.g., through sensor manipulation). The idea is to use a
rule database (e.g., a database of rules specifies whether a
given information should be considered valid or not) and a
checking module that checks the plausibility of the received
messages. Each message is evaluated with respect to its type
(accident report, generic road condition) and the corresponding
predefined rule set is retrieved from the rule database to
check the value of the message element fields (e.g., timestamp,
velocity). For instance, the plausibility of the timestamp field
is checked by determining the minimum and maximum bounds
e.g., the received timestamp must be earlier than the receiver’s
current timestamp tc and later than the difference between the
tc and the validity period of the message. A limitation of this
approach is that since the rule database is shared, a malicious
vehicle can generate valid messages to avoid detection.
C. Location and GPS Signal Verification
Researchers used different techniques to predict the position
and behavior of vehicles (e.g., whether they follow an expected
pattern) in order to identify malicious vehicles. One idea is
to verify node positions using two verifiers [115]: acceptors
(distributed over the region) and rejecters (placed around
acceptors in circular fashion) – say for a given region, by
using multiple RSUs (rejectors) surrounding one (center) RSU
(acceptor). If the message is first received by the acceptors,
then they will verify that the vehicle is within the region.
However a malicious vehicle can spoof its location when it
resides within the region since the protocol does not verify
the exact location of the nodes. Yan et al. [116] proposed to
use on-board radar to detect the physical presence of vehicles
(e.g., for applications such as a congestion alert system).
The vehicles compare radar information (e.g., which vehicles
are in proximity) with the GPS information received from
other vehicles to isolate malicious nodes. The mechanism can
prevent some variants of Sybil attacks, e.g., by calculating
the similarity of radar information, reports from neighbours
and oncoming traffic reports. There exist mechanisms [117],
[119] to verify transmitted CAMs by analyzing the sequence
of messages (e.g., to find the trajectory of each vehicle). By
tracking a vehicle (say by using a Kalman filter5), the receiver
can verify the location contained within each CAM. The idea
is extended [118] to applications where the accuracy of the
Kalman filter is poor (e.g., for special maneuvers or lane
changes scenarios). A signature-based scheme [133] based on
a plausibility checking is proposed where each vehicle is mod-
elled as differently sized (and nested) rectangles – intersecting
rectangles that belong to different vehicles indicate false posi-
tion information. Since the readings from positioning systems
(i.e., GPS) could be inaccurate, the probability of intersections
is calculated by intrusion certainty (based on the number of
observed intersections) and trust values (e.g., using minimum-
distance-moved concept [112] where any neighboring vehicle
Vj who is further than a given vehicle’s transmission range
is considered more trustworthy). When Vj intersects with
another neighbor and the difference between trust levels of
both vehicles is higher than a predefined threshold then the
less trustworthy vehicle is considered to be malicious. While
this method can detect false positions despite GPS errors, an
attacker with larger transmission ranges (compared to other
vehicles) can bypass this mechanism.
Vehicle positions can be verified by physical properties such
as Doppler speed measurements of the received signal [120].
The idea is to use the angle of arrival (AoA) and Doppler
speed measurements. When this information is combined with
the position information included in the message, the estima-
tion error (calculated using an extended Kalman filter based
approach) should not diverge unless the vehicle misbehaves
by transmitting false location information. Another approach
to verify vehicle position is distance bounding [134] – a
technique to estimate distance using physical characteristics
such the speed of light. Since light travels at a finite speed, an
entity (e.g., RSU or other vehicle) can measure the (round-trip)
time to receive a message and determine an upper bound on
the vehicle distance. By using distance bounding mechanisms
Hubaux et al. [121] show that RSUs can verify a vehicle’s
location when: (i) three RSUs are positioned to form a triangle
(for a two dimensional plane) or (ii) four RSUs form a
triangular pyramid (for a three dimensional plane). In a similar
direction, researchers proposed a data-centric mechanism to
verify false position information using timestamps [75]. For
example, when location information Li (timestamped at ti)
is received by a vehicle (located at Lj) at time tj > ti,
the receiver can verify the correctness of this information
using the locations, speed of light and the difference between
timestamps. A malicious vehicle cannot modify timestamps
(say ti) since the exact location between the attacker a receiver
5Kalman filters can accurately predict the movement even under the
influence of errors – for instance, they can be used to correct errors in GPS
measurements [58].
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vehicle is unknown. When a false location is detected the
receiver broadcasts this information to other vehicles (and
perhaps to the CA via RSU).
An attacker can send delayed responses to each RSU [121]
(e.g., by using directed antennas), An alternative trust-based
position verification approach is proposed where a vehicle
discards packets if the included position information is fur-
ther than the predefined maximum acceptance range thresh-
old [122]. Since the recipient negatively weighs abnormal
observations (e.g., the sender’s trust level is more affected by
abnormal observations), after sending one bogus information
packet a (malicious) vehicle is required to send correct in-
formation packets in order to regain its previous trust level.
Similar ideas can be used by exchanging position beacons
among neighbors [123], i.e., beacons received from neighbors
are checked against received neighbor tables by comparing the
(claimed) positions for a particular node in the beacon and
the table. These mechanisms can be improved by (i) ignoring
further beacons when too many of them are sent from one
area (e.g., to limit the impact of potential Sybil attack) (ii)
map-based verification (e.g., by assigning a plausibility value
to the received beacons by comparing the location to the
road map) and (iii) position claim overhearing (e.g., for geo-
routing scenarios by comparing different overheard packets
and respective destinations can provide indications of a false
position in the past) [124]. All of these checks, however, may
not perform well individually [135].
There exist mechanisms to detect GPS spoofing by dead
reckoning, e.g., where the current position is calculated by us-
ing a previously determined position and known (or estimated)
speeds over elapsed time [125]. While this method can detect
spoofed GPS information, the calculated position is only an
approximation. For details of GPS spoofing countermeasures
and recent proposals we refer the readers to further related
work [70], [136].
D. Reputation Analysis and Revocation
Researchers have also proposed mechanisms such as statisti-
cal analysis and explicit voting to decide trustworthiness of the
vehicles. Zaidi et al. [126] use statistical techniques to predict
and explain the trends in traffic flow and determine whether
or not a sender is malicious. Each vehicle Vi estimates its own
flow parameter Fi (that should be similar for vehicles located
closely to Vi) by using a model (that uses vehicle density
per and the average speed of other vehicles in its vicinity).
Vehicles exchange their own flow parameters, density values,
speed and location information. For each received message,
vehicles compare the average of the received parameters to
its own calculated parameters – if the difference is lower
than a predetermined threshold then the message is accepted;
otherwise, the behavior of the sender is monitored (i.e., only
accept messages until it is enough to perform a statistical
test). The malicious vehicle will then be reported to other
vehicles and isolated from the network. A stealthy attacker
(one who manipulates values gradually), however, may remain
undetected. An approach using Bayesian logic has proposed
to compute the ‘probability of maliciousness’ of a vehicle
for a time t, given some observation Ot [127]. The idea
relies on Bayesian reasoning, i.e., computing the probability
of the vehicle being malicious given Ot (e.g., by applying
Bayes’ theorem). This scheme requires prior knowledge of
the probability of reception of a particular message and the
authors do not specify how these conditional probabilities
can be obtained for generic V2X use-cases. The T-VNets
framework [128] evaluates two trust parameters: (a) inter-
vehicles trust (e.g., by combining data-centric evaluation of
messages received from each neighbor) and (b) RSUs-to-
vehicles trust (built by collecting reports from vehicles about
their neighbor’s behaviors – to build a quasi-global historical
and regional trust value). The authors propose to periodically
exchange global trust values by adding the addition of new
fields to the CAM messages. Besides, DENMs are used to
dynamically calculate the trust for specific events (e.g., road
hazards) – the events that have a lower trust value than a
predefined threshold will not be broadcast by the vehicles.
However the authors assume attackers always and persistently
exhibit dishonest behavior throughout time and that may not
be the case in practice.
Raya et al. [71] proposed LEAVE (local eviction of attackers
by voting evaluators): an entropy-based measurement with k-
means clustering to detect which neighbor differentiates from
other neighbors (e.g., a misbehaving vehicle) – say if high
velocity information received from a neighboring (malicious)
vehicle is contradictory to messages from the majority of
vehicles (e.g., for a traffic jam situation) then the malicious ve-
hicle will be detected. Vehicles exchange ‘accusations’ about
potential attackers and the malicious vehicle can be evicted
temporarily (by revoking its certificate). A core advantage of
LEAVE is the reduced detection latency (since vehicle trust
does not need to be built over time). A similar idea is also
proposed by Moore et al. (called Stinger) [129] in which
both the reporting as well as reported vehicles are temporarily
prohibited from sending messages. Both LEAVE and Stinger
protocols require an honest majority – if there exists too many
compromised neighbors then they could present malicious
behaviors as normal (e.g., vulnerable to Sybil attacks). Zhuo
et al. [130] proposed a cooperative local and global eviction
mechanism: SLEP (a so-called suicide-based eviction mecha-
nism that is designed to discourage false accusations) and PRP
(that uses trust level of each accuser to decide on permanent
revocation) respectively, to remove misbehaving vehicles. The
basic idea is that if a vehicle can detect bogus messages (say
by comparing on-board sensor information about the event),
it will broadcast a message accusing the potential attacker
vehicle (and the neighboring vehicles will then ignore the
messages from accused vehicle). In contrast to other work [71]
a vehicle can use pseudonyms (i.e., to protect privacy) and can
re-join the network after a successful accusation. Limitations
of exiting revocation schemes include [137]: (a) they assume
a local honest majority and if an attacker manages to create
a local majority (that is the case of Sybil attacks) then it
is possible to create false accusations (and falsely remove
honest vehicles from the network) and (b) when pseudonyms
are used (i.e., to protect user privacy) an attacker can use
multiple pseudonyms in parallel to create a local majority. For
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voting-based schemes researchers therefore suggest not to use
multiple pseudonyms in parallel (i.e., they should be prevented
by the underlying pseudonym mechanism) [137].
VIII. DISCUSSION
In this section we briefly highlight open issues both for
IEEE 802.11p-based (Section VIII-A) and LTE-based V2X
communications (Section VIII-B). We then review security
issues related to low-level protocols running within a vehicle
(Section VIII-C).
A. Open Issues and Design Considerations
As we mentioned in Section IV-B, the robustness of V2X
technology (due to predefined packet authentication and use
of timestamps) mitigates the severity of spoofing attacks
(e.g., replay or man-in-the-middle attacks). While the use of
digital signatures and PKIs have been widely studied and
standardized for V2X communication, there is a gap between
existing academic research and large scale practical testing
of PKI for V2X applications. It requires further investigation
and experiments to discover (and resolve) potential issues
including ambiguous specifications in standards, equipment
interoperability from different vendors and scalability [8].
There exists a trade-off between different aspects such as
false positive rate, CRL size, complexity, RSU availability.
In addition, most of the existing V2X security solutions are
known for their high computation and delay overheads (see
Sections VI and VII). We also observe that (a) experimental
evaluation and benchmarking of these security solutions have
only been conducted under limited operating conditions and
(b) there exists a lack of evaluation, comparison and feasibility
study for the existing methods. An important problem in
V2X security solutions is that of configurations. For instance,
after what threshold should a message/event/activity should be
considered as malicious? This is itself an important research
challenge since high false positive/negative rates can easily
destabilize any security technique.
There are still remain open questions regarding CRL dis-
tribution and pseudonym change strategies. Modern traffic
analysis techniques can also examine traffic patterns and
extract location information [138]. However, in order for an
attacker to track a vehicle based on BSM/CAM, an attacker
needs to follow the transmitter vehicle to be in close proximity.
Pseudonyms may not be sufficient to prevent location tracking
since an attacker can infer complete travel paths by combining
pseudonyms and location information [139].
While most of the related work focuses on detecting misbe-
having vehicles, designing efficient response mechanisms still
an open issue – this is crucial especially for DoS/DDoS attacks
where it is almost impossible to respond to the attack. Often
solutions proposed in literature assume RSUs are fully trusted
[80], [81], [84]–[87], [95]–[104], [106], [115]. This may not
always be the case in practice since RSUs are deployed
roadside and may be susceptible to physical attacks (e.g.,
sensor tampering, differential power analysis). Therefore, there
is a requirement for layered defense mechanisms that consider
potentially vulnerable RSUs. Another (perhaps less technical)
challenge is that of widespread implementation (e.g., installa-
tion and maintenance) of V2X-compatible infrastructure and
vehicular fleets – the costs for RSUs and the PKI could be
one of the biggest obstacles for full V2X deployment [14].
B. Security Issues for LTE-V2X
3GPP recognizes the need for user authentication (e.g., only
authorized entities should be able to transmit data) and sug-
gests the processing of messages whose data origin has been
verified by the vehicle [140]. 3GPP also states that vehicle
identity should not be long-term trackable or identifiable from
its transmissions. To achieve this, permanent identities of the
vehicles need to be properly protected (and also exposure
minimized say by using pseudonyms). This is important since
fake base-stations can force legitimate vehicles to share their
IMSI (international mobile subscriber identity) and/or location
information [141] and thus could be vulnerable to multiple
classes of attacks (e.g., Sybil and data injection).
While the use of temporary pseudonymous certificates
(for vehicle authentication) provide a measure of privacy
for DSRC/C-ITS, the association with a subscriber ID in
LTE-V2X pose a threat of potential compromise of vehicle
privacy, especially considering cellular network operators [14].
Although 3GPP Release 14 (TS33.185) [142] specifies security
requirements for LTE-V2X, the specifications do not yet
impose any privacy mechanisms for the LTE-V2X PC5 (leaves
this to the regional regulators and operators). While 3GPP
suggests changing and randomizing the layer 2 ID and IP
address of the source (along with changing the application
layer ID), there is no additional protection for the Uu apart
from what current LTE networks support.
There also exist unique issues of LTE-V2X (e.g., mali-
ciously mimic and/or control behavior of the base stations) due
to centralized control in Uu-based LTE-V2X and PC5 mode
3. For example, if an attacker gains control of base stations,
the attacker can (a) fully control scheduling of Uu-links as
well as sidelinks (PC5 mode 3), (b) allocate collided resources
to vehicles to degrade the communication performance, (c)
provide a wrong network configuration to the vehicles and
(d) obtain location information. LTE-V2X PC5 mode 4 and
DSRC/C-ITS, however, are not vulnerable to such issues as
they operate in a fully distributed manner.
C. Threats to Intra-vehicle Components and Countermeasures
Modern vehicles are equipped with a swarm of sensors,
camera, radar, LiDAR that can be tampered by the adversary.
Possible attack surfaces (i.e., from where the attack could orig-
inate) include [6]: (a) vehicle sensors, e.g., acoustic sensors,
odometric sensors (such as wheel encoders, accelerometers,
gyroscope), radar, LiDAR and vision systems (used for object
detection), GPS modules (used for localization and position-
ing) and (b) in-vehicle user devices that can be connected to
the infotainment system via Bluetooth/WiFi/USB. Although
intra-vehicle (e.g., on-board) attacks are not directly related to
communication/network security, such attacks could prevent
the vehicle from operating normally and destabilize V2X
communication networks. For instance, intra-vehicle attacks
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such as side-channel attacks can lead the attacker to infer
the secret information (e.g., cryptographic keys) [143] or DoS
attacks (e.g., that disables the steering/braking/LiDAR/camera
system in an advanced driver assistance systems and auto-
mated driving systems) could disrupt the normal operation of
the vehicle and/or pose threat to human safety [6], [53], [144],
[145]. Recent work on the security of controller area networks
(CANs) [13], [146], [147] – the in-vehicle communication bus
used in some vehicles – has shown that they are vulnerable to
such attacks. Given the fact that the vehicles in the V2X net-
work can be connected to untrusted mediums such as Internet
(e.g., by RSUs), and therefore, the sub-systems, ECUs/OBUs
could be remotely compromised/controllable [145], [148],
[149]. One way to address this problem is to use a central
gateway that enables secure and reliable communications
among a vehicle’s electronic systems [150], [151].
One of the major concerns for securing in-vehicle archi-
tecture is to protect the hardware and applications running
inside ECUs. Researchers has proposed different techniques
such as: (i) use of hardware security modules (HSMs) for
secure boot, processing and storage [152]; (ii) various isolation
mechanisms (e.g., by using virtualization, container, micro-
kernel, etc.) [153], [154]; (iii) hardware/software architecture
for over-the-air (OTA) updates [155]; (iv) statistical analysis
of ECU firmware images by reverse engineering to detect
misbehaving ECUs [156], etc. to name but a few. Despite the
isolation mechanisms, vehicles may still remain insecure due
to implementation bugs and/or poor isolation policies. Besides,
verification of policies/implementations requires enormous ef-
fort for such complex automotive platforms.
Given the vulnerabilities of the CAN bus [13], [157],
[158], a number of mechanisms have been proposed: (i)
encrypting CAN messages and hiding system states to protect
against selective DoS attacks [159]; (ii) use of authentication
schemes (for both ECUs and CAN messages) to ensure their
integrity [160]–[166]; (iii) use of asymmetric cryptography
and certificates to authenticate ECUs and share symmet-
ric keys [167]. Researchers have also studied the use of
behavioral-based intrusion detection systems (IDS) for in-
vehicle networks. However, building such IDS for in-vehicle
networks is challenging due to the large number and hetero-
geneity of ECUs as well as due to limited information exposed
by CAN messages (since they are specific to manufacturers
and/or vehicle model) [8]. While there exist IDSes for in-
vehicle networks (e.g., by utilizing message frequency [168]–
[170], entropy [171], clock skew [172], observing cyber-
physical contexts [173]) these systems may not be able to
detect attacks involving sporadic/irregular CAN messages.
Researchers also proposed to replace the CAN technology
and use other alternatives such as Ethernet [174]–[176]. While
earlier work focus on improving bandwidth and reducing
latency/error rates, the impact of Ethernet on vehicle security
is not thoroughly investigated and require further research.
We also highlight that CAN will most likely remain as
the most common in-vehicle networking technology over
the next decade [176]. Replacing CAN will not solve all
security/privacy issues and security measures (such as IDSes)
built on top of CAN will remain applicable even when CAN
has been replaced [8].
IX. V2X SECURITY PROJECTS AND RELATED WORK
The vehicular communication sector has been widely stud-
ied. In this section we first provide a list of main academic
and industrial research projects actively working on various
aspects of V2X security (Section IX-A). We then summarize
related surveys that discuss security and privacy issues in the
context of V2X applications (Section IX-B).
A. V2X Security Projects
During the last decade there has been the rise of several
research and development projects focusing on securing V2X
communications with a view to design, analyze and test suit-
able security mechanisms. Table V summarizes a comparative
study of the various V2X security projects in the United States
and Europe.
The EVITA project6 aims to develop a secure internal on-
board architecture and on-board communications protocols to
prevent and/or detect illegal tampering. It also considered legal
requirements of on-board networks with respect to privacy,
data protection and liability issues. The simTD project7 inves-
tigated the contribution of secure V2X systems for improving
traffic safety and mobility using real-world field tests. The
project developed different concepts, protocols, cryptographic
procedures and privacy preserving mechanisms for the V2X
field trials. The OVERSEE project8 proposed a secure, open
in-vehicle platform, for the execution of OEM and non-OEM
applications. This project aims to develop protected runtime
environments (for the simultaneous and secure executions)
by providing isolation between independent applications. It
also proposes to provide a secure interface from the outside
world to the internal network of the vehicle. The various
security and privacy aspects (e.g., performance, scalability,
and deployability) of future V2X systems is addressed in
the PRESERVE project9. PRESERVE was one of the main
European projects that experimented with multiple V2X se-
curity/privacy solutions and the design and implementation
efforts were proposed to the standardization bodies. The ISE
project10 aims to design and implement a PKI system that
is compatible with ETSI standard [44]. The CAMP (crash
avoidance metrics partnership) VSC6 (vehicle safety commu-
nications 6) consortium proposed the detection of misbehavior
(e.g., inadvertent transmission of incorrect data) in the V2X
network both in local and network-level (e.g., using in-vehicle
algorithms and processing as well as using a security credential
management system (SCMS) [34]). This research prototype is
now one of the leading candidates to support the establishment
of PKI-based V2X security solution in the United States.
6https://www.evita-project.org/
7http://www.simtd.de
8https://www.oversee-project.com/
9https://www.preserve-project.eu/
10https://www.irt-systemx.fr/en/project/ise/
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TABLE V
QUALITATIVE COMPARISON OF THE MAJOR V2X SECURITY PROJECTS IN EUROPE AND UNITED STATES
EVITA simTD OVERSEE PRESERVE ISE CAMP-VSC6
Project focusa OBS CNS OBS OBS and CNS CNS CNS
Objective On-board
intrusion de-
tection/prevention
Secure V2X
communications
Secure and
standardized
communica-
tion/application
platform
Close-to-market
security/privacy
solution for inter-
and-intra-vehicle
networks
Privacy-
preserving
message
authentication
Security
credential
management
and misbivevior
detection
Evaluation approach Proof-of-concept
implementation
Field trial,
simulations,
conceptualb
Proof-of-concept
implementation
Proof-of-concept
implementation,
simulations
Proof-of-concept
implementation
Conceptualb,
prototype
development
(ongoing)
Reuse of existing
projects
No No Yesc Yesd No No
Use of PKI N/A Yes N/A Yes Yes Yes
Initiative European Union Germany European Union European Unione France United States
Status Completed (2008-
2011)
Completed (2008-
2013)
Completed (2010-
2012)
Completed (2011-
2015)
Completed (2014-
2017)
Ongoing (2016-
present)
aScope of the security analysis – OBS: Intra-vehicle (on-board) security, CNS: Inter-vehicle (communication/networking) security.
bConceptual/analytical/architectural demonstration of the system components – not implemented/verified/tested on real systems.
cUsed the concept/implementation of hardware-based security module from EVITA project.
dReused various components from multiple past projects (e.g., EVITA, simTD, etc.)
eCAMP consortium was also a supporting partner of this project.
B. Related Surveys
A number of surveys have been published on various
aspects of the vehicular communications in the last decade. In
prior work Saini et al. [9] provide a meta-survey of existing
research for generic VANET (vehicular ad hoc network)
domain. There also exists early research discussing applica-
tion/platforms [177] and communication technologies [178].
However vehicular security and privacy aspects are not well
studied. Prior work [5], [6], [147] briefly reviews the security
and privacy issues of in-vehicle protocols (e.g., CAN) –
although communication aspects and standardization activities
are not discussed.
Security and privacy issues in conventional vehicular net-
works have also been largely studied and there exist multiple
surveys [8], [14], [33], [57], [58], [65], [66], [179]–[183] that
discuss several aspects (e.g., functional requirements, proto-
cols, vulnerabilities, etc.). In an early study [66] researchers
survey various misbehavior (both faulty and malicious) de-
tection approaches and countermeasures against spreading
malicious data in the vehicular networks. However this work
is primary focus on false data injection attacks and does
not cover the broader scope of the field. Azees et al. [179]
study VANETs as a special case of mobile ad-hoc network
– a common view in the past – and does not cover the
class of attacks against safety-critical systems (e.g., false data
injection) as is the case for modern V2X applications. Recent
work [57] also surveys detection mechanisms for various
classes of vehicular communication attacks (e.g., DoS and
network layer attacks). However the above work primarily
focuses on routing-oriented attacks and defence mechanisms.
Arshad et al. [65] summarize the false information detection
techniques for generic VANETs. Lu et al. [180] survey anony-
mous authentication schemes and Hamida et al. [181] study
challenges related to the secure and safe V2X applications
for ETSI C-ITS standard – although their primary focus
is on cryptographic countermeasures. In contrast our survey
aims to provide a general overview of the security aspects
of the modern V2X (e.g., DSRC/C-ITS as well as C-V2X)
platforms/applications.
Recent surveys by Hasrouny et al. [33] and MacHardy
et al. [14] provide a broad overview of the V2X communi-
cation including different radio access technologies, standard-
ization efforts, attack techniques as well as security issues. Le
et al. [8] also studied the security and privacy requirements
both, from intra- as well as inter-vehicle perspective. However,
due to the very broad scope, all of the aforementioned work
does not provide sufficient details on detection mechanisms. A
survey of the existing trust models for VANETs has also been
carried out [182]. Kamel et al. [183] study multiple misbehav-
ior detection methods and then discuss their feasibility with
respect to current standards, hardware/software requirements
as well as with law compliance. Recent work [58] studies
misbehavior detection mechanisms for V2X applications – al-
though authors mainly focus on the DSRC/C-ITS context, and
unlike us, they do not provide details about communication
stacks, related security standards and challenges for emerging
technologies such as LTE-V2X.
We highlight that while prior work has covered a wide
range of the security and privacy aspects, most of the previous
surveys focus on some of the issues and do not provide broad
view of the field. We believe our work complements prior
surveys and provides a holistic overview of existing V2X
security issues and possible countermeasures.
X. CONCLUSION
In the near future V2X communication technology is ex-
pected to revolutionize the modern ground transportation sys-
tem. With the emergence of this modern technology, V2X ap-
plications will potentially be targeted by the malicious entities
(as evident by the recent real-world attacks on automotive
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systems [13], [184]–[186]) and there is a requirement of
layered defence mechanism to improve the resiliency of such
systems. In this survey we provided an overview of current
V2X security standards, potential security threats and different
detection approaches. While in this paper our primary focus in
on V2X technology, the novel security mechanisms developed
for V2X applications can be used to improve the security
of broader safety-critical cyber-physical domains [187], [188].
We believe this research will be tangential and valuable to the
academic/industry researchers, developers, systems engineers
and standardization agencies working in systems security
fields in general.
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